Appropriating Death, Reverie, and Experience: Examining Rousseau’s Adaptation of Montaigne’s “On Practice” in *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*

BY DANIEL WHITTEN

At the Bibliothèque nationale de France, we find an engraving of Rousseau, done four years after his death, of his arrival at the Elysian Fields.¹ The group of ancient philosophers waiting there welcomes him as one of their own. The only other non-classical figure in the image presents Rousseau to the esteemed group; this presenter is Michel de Montaigne. It is surely no coincidence that this engraving, from 1782, comes in the same year that the first edition of Rousseau’s *Reveries of the Solitary Walker* is posthumously released.² If Montaigne’s *Essays* are a forerunner of Rousseau,³ we see this influence most explicitly in his later autobiographical works, of which the *Reveries* are the culmination. Indeed, many scholars acknowledge this link between the *Essays* and the *Reveries*.⁴ A thorough analysis of this complicated relationship would require exponentially more knowledge, time, and space than I can provide with this essay. However, it is possible to look at one example, in which this influence is exceptionally evident, as a case study for the relationship between Montaigne and Rousseau. In the second ‘walk’ of his *Reveries*, Rousseau presents a personal account that is

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¹ See Appendix, fig. 1.
strikingly similar to the one Montaigne presents in his essay, “Of Practice.” In his appropriation of “Of Practice,” Rousseau conflates Montaigne’s conclusions about death with his own ideal of reverie, while also manipulating the narrative to present his own wider philosophy. To illustrate this, I will first outline the similarities and differences between the two accounts, before comparing my conclusions with similar scholarship.

Rousseau himself compares his Reveries to Montaigne’s Essays in the very first chapter of the work. “My enterprise is like Montaigne’s,” he says, “but my motive is entirely different.” This is evident throughout the Reveries, whether or not we believe his subsequent attestation that Montaigne “wrote his essays only for others to read, whereas I am writing down my reveries for myself alone.” It is significant that Montaigne is the only person Rousseau names in this opening discussion, in which he defines the project of the Reveries. Thus, Rousseau claims to be “alone in the world, with no brother, neighbour or friend, nor any company left to me but my own,” except, perhaps, this other French autobiographer, who paves his way to the Champs Elysées. Rousseau begins the Reveries by cleansing his writing of all outsiders; he ends his introduction by widening this circle ever so slightly, allowing Montaigne into a special position, before he begins his version of “Of Practice” in the second walk.

Jenene Allison and Colette Fleuret treat this importance of Montaigne to the Reveries in detail in their examinations of Rousseau’s work. In her dissertation, “Reading Autobiography: Self-Representation in Rousseau’s Reveries,” Allison spends some time examining the connection between the second walk and “Of Practice” in the course of her analysis of the

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5 RSW, 2, 35-45; Essays, 1:6, 267-75.
6 Ibid, 1, 33-4.
Reveries. She also devotes time to the influence of Descartes, Montesquieu, and d'Alembert on Rousseau. It is important to note that Rousseau borrows only philosophical and allegorical ideas from these Enlightenment thinkers, whereas his relationship with Montaigne involves a more direct appropriation of actual content. Fleuret treats these works in her dissertation, now published as the book Rousseau et Montaigne, in which she examines the complicated relationship Rousseau has with Montaigne throughout his writings. She describes “l’attitude de Rousseau envers Montaigne: D’une part il l’admire, le lit, s’en pénètre, le copie, l’imite constamment. D’autre part il se sépare de lui, le renie, lui reproche d’être insincere, tiède, accommodant, « comme les autres », ou plus souvent le passe sous silence.” Specifically, she treats the second walk alongside two other walks in which she also finds Rousseau’s appropriation of Montaigne. She finds Montaigne as the inspiration behind Rousseau’s discussions of the vanity of philosophers in the third walk and of truth and falsehood in the fourth walk. If we accept her assertion, this creates a trilogy of Montaignian influences, which form a large portion of the first half of the Reveries. This eases the French reader from a familiar autobiographical context into the novelty of Rousseau’s reverie; this process begins with almost identical accounts of near-death accidents.

8 Ibid., 114-125, 42-55, 126-39.
9 Fleuret, Rousseau et Montaigne, 150-3.
10 Ibid., 12, “The attitude of Rousseau toward Montaigne: “On one hand he admires him (Montaigne), reads his work, is penetrated by it, copies him, imitates him constantly. On the other hand he(Rousseau) parts from him, denies him, blames him for being insincere, tepid, accommodating, ” as the others “, or more often he passes under silence.”
11 Ibid., 150, 151-5; RSW, 3, 47-62; RSW, 4, 63-80.
Though their accounts are remarkably similar, they introduce them within very different settings. Montaigne, as Allison phrases it, gives his account “under the sign of the god of war,” that is, the incident takes place on his way home from battle, “during our third civil war, or the second.” This theme of war, death, and pain follows Montaigne’s narrative throughout the account. Fleuret reminds us that the context for the accident is not benign, but has Montaigne “au cours d’un combat, l’épée à la main.” This theme returns later in his essay, as Montaigne deals with the implications of his experience. Rousseau, conversely, is coming home after a day spent “amid these peaceful meditations,” idyllically meandering down a hill, lost in his own thoughts. Rousseau, like Montaigne, foreshadows the tone of his later reflections with the setting of his account. He focuses here on the peace of his uninterrupted solitude—alone with his own self: not in contemplation, only in reverie. The peace of this benign, passive actor is interrupted by the wanton and unmerited violence of both fate and his fellow man. Thus, either setting foreshadows the later conclusions and tone of the writer.

In these differing states, Montaigne and Rousseau are both violently knocked unconscious by charging animals. A reckless groom, charging ahead of his peers on a horse, hits Montaigne; the force of the impact knocks him off his horse, “so that there lay the horse bowled over and stunned, and I ten or twelve paces beyond, dead, stretched on my back.” In his account, Montaigne specifically emphasizes the size of the groom, especially in relation to himself, and the force of the impact. He mentions that he “took a very easy but not very strong

13 Essays, 2:6, 268.
14 Fleuret, Rousseau et Montaigne, 151., “during a fight, sword in hand…”
15 RSW, 2, 38.
16 Essays, 2:6, 269.
horse,” and that the groom, who was “big and strong, riding a powerful work horse … came down like a colossus on the little man and little horse, and hit us like a thunderbolt with all his strength and weight, sending us both head over heels.” This focus on the severity of the accident allows him to justify his later comparisons of this experience with death; setting his experience in less intense terms would dilute his conclusions about death, experience, and autobiography.

Rousseau’s accident occurs when a Great Dane, “rushing at full tilt” in front of a carriage, bowls him over.17 His account focuses on the immediate reaction of the mind, which forms a plan that he “had no time either to examine or put into practice.” This theme of celebrating the mind, while concurrently denigrating the body, permeates the second walk. His accident, unlike Montaigne’s, is not anybody’s fault. Whereas Montaigne’s groom, “in order to show his daring and get ahead of his companions, spurred his horse at full speed up the path,”18 Rousseau’s Great Dane “saw me too late to be able to check its speed or change its course.”19 This may appear, at first, like a lost opportunity for Rousseau to chastise humanity’s amour-propre. However, Rousseau here sets up his narrative for his conclusion, in which he examines the role of fate, in collusion with amour propre, in deepening his misfortunes.

We can read Montaigne and Rousseau’s accounts of their injuries in this same foreshadowing tone. Montaigne emphasizes the mortal gravity of his injuries; he tells how “so great an abundance of blood had fallen into my stomach … I threw up a whole bucketful of clots of pure blood … life was hanging only by the tip of my lips … my stomach was oppressed

17 RSW, 2, 38.
18 Essays, 2:6, 269.
19 RSW, 2, 38.
with clotted blood.” Montaigne here again focuses on his closeness to death, how he “was certain he was mortally wounded.” There is a particular focus here on the internality of his injuries. He tells us about the symptoms he felt most immediately, and does not mention his external injuries until he has begun to convalesce, after which he tells us about his “limbs … all batter and bruised.” Again, the intensity of this injury reinforces the authority of his experience, and the internality of his experience demands external representation through his writing.

Rousseau reports his extensive and impressive list of external injuries, and the absence of any sort of immediate internal injury. Once he finally arrives home, he takes gruesome stock of his injuries:

My upper lip was split on the inside right up to the nose; on the outside the skin had given it some protection and prevented it from coming completely apart; I had four teeth knocked in on my top jaw, all the part of my face over this jaw extremely swollen and bruised, my right thumb sprained and very swollen, my left thumb badly injured, my left arm sprained, and my left knee likewise very swollen and quite unbendable because of a violent and painful contusion.

He qualifies this account by asserting that, “in spite of all this battering, there was nothing broken.” Rousseau presents his injuries in stark contrast to Montaigne’s, emphasizing the necessary fragility of appearance, compared to internal integrity. This, again, foreshadows his later conclusion that the conspiracy of fate and his enemies against him may injure his physical, temporal self, but his soul is sacred and unaffected. Further, Rousseau only feels internal pain once he is forced to reintegrate with society once more. He speaks of his inability to deal with the false rumours of his death, saying, “this was more than enough to upset me, particularly in the state of agitation in which my accident and the ensuing fever had left my mind … [I] talked

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20 Essays, 2:6, 269-72.
21 RSW, 2, 40.
about what was going on around me in a way that suggested a feverish delirium rather than
the sangfroid of a man whom the world no longer interests.” He only mentions this ‘agitation’
and ‘fever’ once he comes to face the intrusion of society’s _amour propre_ on his solitude. Thus,
Rousseau adds another layer to Montaigne’s account by associating these internal and
psychological impairments with the involvement of society, a distinction not present in
Montaigne’s account.

Thus far, this essay has focused on how Rousseau’s interpretation changes Montaigne’s
account. While it is important not to downplay these differences, I would be remiss not to
address the fact that Rousseau chooses Montaigne’s “Of Practice” for a reason. We can search
for clues as to the motive behind this choice in the similarities between the two accounts. These
similarities are most evident in the descriptions of their reactions, immediately following the
incident. Montaigne experiences something like an out of body experience upon his return to
consciousness. He describes a state that is at once an intimate connection of the soul with the
body, as “the functions of the soul … were reviving with the same progress as those of the
body,”\(^22\) while also being a numbing of the soul, and a separation from bodily sensations:

> It seemed to me that my life was hanging only by the tip of my lips; I closed
> my eyes in order, it seemed to me, to help push it out, and took pleasure in
growing languid and letting myself go. It was an idea that was only floating
> on the surface of my soul, as delicate and feeble as all the rest, but in truth not
> only free form distress but mingled with that sweet feeling that people have
> who let themselves slide into sleep.\(^23\)

This apparent contradiction is evidence of Montaigne’s caution in regards to philosophical and
theological considerations: he mentions the concordance between the body and soul to

\(^22\) Essays, 2:6, 269.
\(^23\) Ibid., 269-70
emphasize the importance of the body as our gift from God, yet he also is eager to emphasize
his closeness to death, in which his soul is separated from the physical world. What is
especially peculiar about this experience, and something that is analogous to Rousseau’s
experience, is the state of his cognitive abilities. Montaigne tells us that, while injured, he gives
clear and seemingly lucid instructions to his family. “It would seem that this consideration
must have proceeded from a wide-awake soul; yet the fact is that I was not there at all,” he
writes. In fact, he tells us they “were idle thoughts, in the clouds, set in motion by the
sensations of the eyes and ears; they did not come from within me.” He summarizes the entire
surreal experience as “in truth, very pleasant and peaceful; I felt no affliction either for others or
for myself; it was a languor and an extreme weakness, without any pain.” It is this painless
surreality, this state in which Montaigne is alone with nothing but his own soul, that he finds
justification for his views on death. Rousseau picks up this ambivalent view of temporal,
physical suffering, yet is particularly attracted to this dream-like state of Montaigne’s.

The events of Rousseau’s account are somewhat different from Montaigne’s, but they
share some striking similarities. Though he has control over his bodily movements, Rousseau
too experiences a sort of semi-detachment, which includes heightened sensations of experience.
Like Montaigne, who becomes conscious “to a vision so blurred, weak, and dead, that I still
could distinguish nothing from the light,”24 Rousseau’s first sign of consciousness is sight,
though his is somewhat clearer, as he “saw the sky, some stars, and a few leaves.”25 Rousseau
adopts the heavenly imagery of light and sky, but de-emphasizes Montaigne’s focus on the

24 Ibid., 269.
25 RSW, 2, 39.
shortcomings of sensation. For Rousseau, his awakening “was a moment of delight.”

Rousseau aligns himself most strikingly with Montaigne in his descriptions of his self-awareness at this point. Like Montaigne’s “pleasant and peaceful” state, Rousseau feels “neither pain, fear, nor anxiety,” which is no small matter for someone as persecuted and paranoid as Jean-Jacques. As Montaigne “saw myself all bloody,” Rousseau “watched my blood flowing as I might have watched a stream, without even thinking the blood had anything to do with me.” Rousseau then proceeds to walk home. He continues through the Parisian streets on foot, forsaking a cab in favour of his own promenade, enraptured in his own reverie, unaware of his grievous injuries. Rousseau takes a few things from Montaigne here. First, he adopts the idea of a numbness and pleasure in death, which is separated from physical pain or sensations. This aids him in his conclusions about his own mortality and suffering. He also takes up, to a degree, the separation of cognition from observation and spiritual sensation. Rousseau, though able to admire the profound beauty of nature, cannot remember his address, or even his country of residence, just as for Montaigne, “the last thing I was able to recover was my memory.” This only enhances Rousseau’s particular attachment to Montaigne’s surreal experience.

Rousseau’s text centers on the concept of reverie, which he describes as, “when I give free reign to my thoughts and let my ideas follow their natural course, unrestricted and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{26}}\text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{27}}\text{Essays, 2:6, 272.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{28}}\text{RSW, 2, 39.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{29}}\text{Essays, 2:6, 269.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{30}}\text{RSW, 2, 39.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{31}}\text{Ibid., 40.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{32}}\text{Ibid., 39.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{33}}\text{Essays, 2:6, 272.} \]
unconfined.” It seems that he sees a glimpse of near-perfect reverie in Montaigne’s near-death experience, though Montaigne may not recognize it as such. For Rousseau, the less restricted and confined his reveries are, the better they become. Thus, he later says, “sometimes my reveries end in meditation, but more often my meditations end in reverie,” that is, structured thinking confines reverie. “Reverie amuses and distracts me, thought wearies and depresses me; thinking has always been for me a disagreeable and thankless occupation,” he tells us. It is clear, then, how the concept of Montaigne’s spiritual sensation—without cognition—greatly appeals to Rousseau. Thus, though his account may differ in detail and focus, Rousseau is deeply indebted to Montaigne’s essay here, for both the argument for ambivalence in death, and for a the concept of a higher state of reverie therein.

Both Montaigne and Rousseau segue from their experiences to conclusions that are more general. Montaigne begins by solidifying his position that we should not fear death. He says that his “pleasant and peaceful” daze “is the same state in which people find themselves whom we see fainting with weakness in the agony of death; and I maintain that we pity them without cause.” From the beginning of the Essays, “this has always been my view,” yet he strengthens his argument here with the justification of his own experience. The closer he comes to death—with his life “hanging only by the tip of my lips”—the more his soul secludes itself from the body, “with that sweet feeling that people have who let themselves slide into sleep.” In order to use this proof to support his claim, he must defend the validity of the autobiographical content of the Essays, for “it should not be held against me … What is useful

34 RSW, 2, 35.
36 Ibid.
37 Essays, 2:6, 272; ibid., 270.
to me may also be by accident useful to another.” He defends his writing against possible accusations of vanity and presumption, arguing that he does not prescribe action, nor vaunt his own righteousness, but simply comes to know himself through constant self-examination. He argues that “it is not my deeds that I write down; it is my essence,” and offers this self-examination as a remedy against vanity, presumption, and self-righteousness. Thus, his experience and his conclusion mutually support each other, for his rare experience with death justifies the sharing of his experience and the recording of his self-examination forces him to look critically at his experience. Montaigne emphasizes that he writes “not for my teaching, but my study; it is not a lesson for others, but for me.” It is this point that he reiterates throughout the latter part of the essay. Montaigne wants to assure both his readers and his critics that he has no special access to metaphysical truth: his only useful contribution is his own series of experiences, and his musing thereon. This plays well into his burgeoning skepticism, as he rejects universalization, and begins to depend more on the testimony of experience. Thus, he offers his “humble and inglorious life” to the scrutiny others, for them to join him in examining the machinations of nature, as “men bear the entire form of man’s estate.” Montaigne does not presume to offer his life as particularly exemplary, only as one of many flawed examples, and urges us to read his Essays as the examination of such a life.

Rousseau’s immediate conclusions on death are comparable to those of Montaigne, yet his subsequent revelations and general philosophical suppositions about human nature take these conclusions in a different direction. Rousseau tells of how the rumour of his death spreads around France after his accident. He describes in detail the ways in which his character
is slandered and attacked after his supposed death. This, for Rousseau, not only solidifies his belief in the degeneracy of society through *amour propre*, but it also reinforces his sense of isolation and persecution. However, these conclusions are not novel for Rousseau. What is transformative about this second walk is that he now realizes that “the plot that I previously saw as nothing but the fruit of human malevolence,” in that it should always succeed, “is Heaven’s eternal decree.” Thus, while Montaigne uses his encounter with death to strengthen his skepticism, Rousseau uses the same to deepen his belief in the necessity of his condition. From here, Rousseau asserts his lack of agency, and he takes comfort in this release. “This idea … brings me consolation, tranquility and resignation,” he writes; his acceptance of God’s providence leads him to a deeper faith in His justice. This assurance insists he “must learn to suffer in silence,” for everything is now outside of his control, and his only course of action is accept his injuries as they come. This conclusion solidifies Rousseau’s endorsement of reverie. True reverie, as in his post-accident state, is “entirely taken up with the present.” Thus, it offers the opportunity for pleasure and rapture, even amid widespread persecution; he need not consider past or future injury, only his current state of being. Therefore, Rousseau takes Montaigne’s ambivalence towards death, and turns it to an endorsement thereof, in light of his subsequent revelation of his profound lack of agency. He reaches this conclusion from both his experience with near-death, and his experience with perceived death, in his accident and the rumours, respectively. The latter confirms his conception of social degeneration, while the former allays fears of death and promotes the temporary solution for his anxiety; that is,

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38 See RSW, 2, 41-4.

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reverie. He takes up Montaigne’s nascent idea of reverie and holds it up as his ideal, particularly in light of the necessity of his persecution.

Allison and Fleuret offer detailed interpretations of the relationship between these two texts; however, both of them fail to treat some fundamental issues therein. Allison sees the crux of both accounts as anxiety about the unstable nature of their self-representational legacies. She reads Montaigne’s account of his reactions to be a “radical fiction,” and with the subsequent description of speaking without cognition, he “explores the possibility of being misrepresented by his text.” 39 This inevitably leads to the possibility of misrepresentation throughout his whole corpus. This is why Rousseau attaches himself to the story, in that he also experiences the fear of being misrepresented. 40 Though she treats Rousseau’s technical adaptation of Montaigne in admirable detail, Allison’s interpretation of, and justification for Rousseau’s adaptation is somewhat lacking. Though she admits, “It is not my purpose here to consider in depth Montaigne’s position on self-representation in the Essays as a whole,” 41 it should fall within the scope of her argument to consider the context of Montaigne’s account within the essay itself, at least. The meaning of his account of the subconscious conversation is implicit, at best, and the interpretation of it solely as metaphor is unfounded. Further, while the later discussion of self-representation does urge caution, it is not for fear of outward misrepresentation, but of self-delusion through self-misrepresentation. He cautions against “anyone [who] gets intoxicated with his knowledge when he looks beneath him[self],” 42 and recommends Socrates’s approach

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 113n22.
42 Essays, 2:6, 275.
of constant questioning as the best approach.\textsuperscript{43} It seems that Allison fails to look beyond the accounts themselves in order to consider their wider conclusions. For, if Rousseau’s sole purpose in adapting Montaigne’s essay is to highlight the potential for misinterpretation of the text, he does not need to give such specific detail of the account, especially not regarding his subsequent state of reverie. Similarly, he would have been better off concluding with statements decrying misrepresentation, instead of an existential discussion of death and agency. Thus, while providing a promising initial reading, Allison’s conclusions are too limited in their considerations, not analyzing the implications of each account’s wider context in Rousseau’s adaptation.

Fleuret’s reading, offers a more nuanced reading in that it considers both Montaigne and Rousseau’s accounts as texts for analysis, whereas Allison is primarily focused on an analysis of Rousseau. For Fleuret, the accounts both essentially attempt to reconcile death with the writer’s context. She points to the context of war, and the specific focus on examples of violence, injury, and torture,\textsuperscript{44} to justify her reading of Montaigne as reconciling himself to the death that is constantly present around him.\textsuperscript{45} In his experience of death, Montaigne finds a balm, in that he can understand death to be an ambivalent, perhaps even pleasant experience. Rousseau, she argues, internalizes this conclusion, not to reconcile himself with the suffering of others, but to confront his own fears of death. “\textit{Son obsession à lui, ce n’est pas la torture, mais la solitude, car c’est elle seulement qui lui rend la mort redoutable,}” and, now that he has experienced this mortal solitude with reverie instead of fear, he is able to accept fate and necessity with an

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} See Essays, 2:6, 268, 270, 271.
\textsuperscript{45} Fleuret, Rousseau et Montaigne, 151-2.
\textsuperscript{46} “His obsession for him, not torture, but solitude, for it is only making him the dreaded death...”
open heart. She sees this as a contrary notion to that of Montaigne, whose conclusion “me paraît plus tragique.” This is a much more defensible reading than Allison’s. Fleuret acknowledges the nuance of the different treatments of death, and how Rousseau adapts Montaigne’s conclusions to fit his own experience. I do feel that her emphasis on Rousseau’s initial fear of solitude is somewhat ungrounded, as he seems to fear the past more than he fears being alone: the initial hindrance to his reverie in this walk was that “there is more recollection than creation in the products of my imagination.” In fact, he begins the walk in praise of this aspect of his persecution, for “these hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones in the day when I am completely myself and my own master.” Rousseau chooses this essay of Montaigne’s not only to appropriate its conclusions on death, but also for its association of reverie with death. It is not that Rousseau is afraid of the solitude in death, and has his mistake corrected: Rousseau fails to disassociate his death and pain from his persecutors; when he can associate death with solitude and nature, instead of with society and corruption, he can marry his ideal of solitary reverie with death. This association is what allows Rousseau to willingly accept his fate. This also offers a more thorough understanding of his choice of “Of Practice,” over any of Montaigne’s other essays. It is not, as Fleuret presents, simply to appropriate his treatment of death, nor to imitate his alleged fear of misrepresentation; while these themes may lend themselves to his purpose, Rousseau ultimately finds a nascent construction of the ideal of reverie in Montaigne—the only intellectual predecessor he acknowledges.

47 Ibid., 152.
48 Ibid., “seems tragic to me…”
49 RSW, 2, 35.
50 Ibid.
We must read Rousseau’s interpretation of “Of Practice” as a fusion of his conception of reverie with Montaigne’s conception of death. If we accept this as the basis for the interpretation, with the subsequent changes meant to adapt Montaigne’s account to Rousseau’s philosophy, we can more fully understand the deep significance of Rousseau’s choice of this essay, and how it reverberates through the second walk, and further throughout the Reveries. It is clear that Fleuret was correct in her assessment of Rousseau’s relationship to Montaigne, in that it cannot be simply defined. We certainly cannot believe Rousseau’s dismissal of Montaigne; we can see that he is indebted to Montaigne, for not only does he adopt the same content, or subject, or tone, but he finds in Montaigne some unique connection with his own self. Perhaps for Rousseau, as for Emerson, “it seemed to me as if I had myself written the book, in some former life, so sincerely it spoke to my thought and experience.”\textsuperscript{51} Regardless of whether we read Rousseau’s adaptation as shameless plagiarism, butchering Montaigne’s own conclusions, or as an inspired reading of compatible ideas, it is clearly an offense to assume that Rousseau blithely appropriates Montaigne. There is clearly a great deal of subtext and implicit commentary in the presentation of his reading of Montaigne, and this deserves acknowledgement.

Figure 1. Adrien Macret, Arrivé de J.J. Rousseau aux Champs Elisées, 1782. Intaglio engraving of drawing by Jean-Michel Moreau, 23.4 x 33.0 cm. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France. Available at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b6950589q. Note the positions of Rousseau and Montaigne, and how their attire makes them stand out from the other figure.